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About a year ago in a Times Literary Supplement review, the English novelist Lawrence 
Norfolk praised the emerging generation of US writers for resisting the allure of the medi- 
ated culture and providing readers with 'news of a rare and real America' ('Closing time in 
the fun-house' 26). Norfolk is thinking of William T. Vollmann's red light districts (mostly 
cleaned up now and Hilton-ed over), Jonathan Franzen's inner city (newly gentrified), 
Richard Powers's intelligentsia (last seen working online), and David Foster Wallace's 
mid-priced cruise ships, halfway houses, and rural state fairs (now mostly funded by cor- 
porations). Norfolk would probably oppose this America to the more globally familiar pro- 
spect of 'total operationality, hyperreality, total control' and total interchangeability of sign 
and referent that Jean Baudrillard finds here, along with technology's 'mortal decon- 
struction of the body' ('Simulacra' 121, 11 1, cited in Simulacrum America 6). 
To the contributors in Simulacrum America, however, Baudrillard's America is no less 
real than the vanishing spaces of the naturalist tradition; and its media representations are 
by now so familiar that they hardly count as news. Now that Roland Barthes's 'empire of 
signs' has been digitized, continental theory sounds less provocative, more descriptive of 
things as they are. What is new, however, and what separates this collection from main- 
stream critical writing, is the editors' recognition that, with the technologization of every- 
thing, criticism itself no longer looks the same: 'When the distance between the real and 
the imaginary begins to disappear,' they write, 'there is no longer any space for an ideal or 
critical projection' (6). And so, beyond the global understanding of America offered from 
these mostly European critics, the collection poses a local problem for critical writing: 
Under circumstances of simulation, working in the nonspace of Baudrillard's hyperreal 
and the virtual reality of cybernetic media, what's left for criticism itself to do? 
When literature's most compelling historical fictions have 'long given up the binary 
concept of fact versus imagination' (8) and when mass media imagery has made 'the 
very concept of "representation" ... problematic' (I), it makes little sense to think of 
criticism as a mediation between fiction and reality, or as a guide to the imaginative life 
of great and distant authors. Close reading becomes redundant when the media environ- 
ment closes in on perception, and the more we are able to engineer our own dreams the 
harder it becomes 'to imagine anything other than what is,' as Frederic Jameson already 
noted in 1971 (cited by Kraus and Auer 4). As a Marxist, Jameson of course deplored 
the absence of any 'great political and Utopian theories' but the essays in this collection, 
presented originally at a November 1997 conference in Graz, Austria, take a more af- 
firmative stance. Like Jameson, many of these writers deal with science fiction but 
(unlike Jameson) not all of them look to SF for utopian or critical possibilities. There are 
no cognitive maps of Simulacrum America, only further acts of cognition. Hence a more 
likely role for criticism is to become, like the work it discusses, not so much a separate 
genre as 'a mode of awareness about the world,' less a utopian or even a future-oriented 
project than a reflective engagement with the world as it is (Kraus and Auer 5, citing 
Csiscery-Ronay). 
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But SF is not the only topic under discussion in this wide-ranging volume. Interactive 
media, Baudrillard's and Don DeLillo's 'cultural pathology,' Avant-Pop literature, Africa 
Online, and the simulated realities of empire, gender identity, cinematic representation, 
and social reportage all come in for sustained analysis. The range of subjects covered over 
seventeen essays and a substantial introduction indicates the extent of the recent migration 
of literary into cultural criticism. Without doubt, the collection can be recommended for 
adoption in forward looking classes in American Cultural Studies, whose emergence as a 
discipline - really the reorientation of existing disciplines - is in some ways a product of 
the mediated reality it studies. In fact, my one reservation about this collection - extending 
to a reservation about the idea of America itself as a simulated reality - would be that the 
essays lack an independent organizing principle - independent, that is, of the media they 
engage. What, if anything, could have been left out? Having given up on a specifically 
literary otherness - the defamiliarizing force of aesthetic interest, literature's onetime 
source of utopian possibility - criticism more and more often meets the media system on 
its terms, following topics and agendas that it selects. 
But at the same time as criticism sustains a fascination with popular culture, it has yet to 
achieve the degree of selectivity and self-reflexivity that has evolved in the mass media 
themselves. These work as an independent system, according to the German social theorist 
Niklas Luhmann, not by filling in for an absent reality (as Baudrillard suggests) but by 
reducing the complexity of the cultural environment to a single distinction - between 
information and non-information. Unless an item (of news, entertainment, advertising, and 
so forth) can be perceived as information, its reality remains outside the media system and 
unavailable for simulation. A disorganized, non-informatable environment does exist - it 
is real, it can be experienced, and it may even be true. But this reality will not be visible to 
the media system unless it can be cast as information - the only value the media are prone 
to recognize. 'Without such a reflexive value,' Luhmann writes, 'the system would be at 
the mercy of everything that comes its way; and that also means it would be unable to 
distinguish itself from the environment, to organize its own reduction of complexity, its 
own selection' (17). 
If our media-constructed reality does indeed remain wholly 'within information,' as the 
cyberspace theorist Marcos Novak recognizes, must we 'ourselves be reduced to bits' in 
order to be 'represented by the system'? In Novak, and in the Cyberpunk novelists con- 
sidered by Elisabeth Kraus, Alen Vitas, and others, the response to an exclusively informa- 
tional reality is to produce more of the same, to create verbal and visual 'landscapes of 
spatialized information' where we ourselves might 'become information anew' (Novak, 
cited by Kraus 109). Thus when the novel is competitively challenged by proliferating 
non-literary modes of narration and representation, Cyberpunk's 'answer,' its 'last line of 
defense,' has been 'to make narrative fiction more 'digital' and thus able to compete with 
digital media in the battle for an increasingly dissipating audience' (Vitas 124). Few obser- 
vers of the scene ever thought it likely that such resistance would be effective over the long 
term, as the writers themselves went on in their careers 'galloping in a dozen directions at 
once' (Sterling, cited by Frelik 93). A more cogent argument, advanced by critics versed in 
cognitive psychology and media discourse theory, holds that literature is more successful 
when it emphasizes its medial otherness -its stability in print, its longer cycles of produc- 
tion and reception that protect it from the mass media's high rate of turnover, and its dis- 
creteness in bound volumes which helps sustain in readers the illusion of a world apart. 
Pave1 Frelik gets at this last distinction when he opposes literature's traditional aim of 
'creating cognitive dissonance' with attempts to 'bridge that gap' in later Cyberpunk 
fiction. Instead of seeking a platform for resistance outside the media system, Cyberpunk 
keeps close to the periphery as 'a genre about the world that we know but don't know and 
about the future which exists to enable us to understand the present' (93). 
What Frelik is describing in Cyberpunk fiction is a cognition that is more fluid and sur- 
rounding than dissonant or distancing, more like the communications media themselves in 
that it vigorously forgets the past and anticipates only those future elements that it can act 
on in the present. The priority of present information over established 'truth' is given by 
Ruediger Kunow in an essay on Robert Coover, E.L. Doctorow, and other novelists 
writing second-order historical fictions 'in the face of Media Representations of American 
history.' The media representations, Kunow notes, can be discussed 'independently of 
their truth status vis-i-vis a past real so that they can be seen as part of a discursive praxis 
in which historical material is made present' (25). For these postmodernist writers, ig- 
noring the media images is not an option: the images are present as a publicly accessible, 
distributed cognitive background against which any focused, personal, and conscious 
understanding has to set itself. And this, too, helps explain the strength of the media, what 
creates their overall reality-effect. Neither the media nor distributed cognition can burden 
themselves with too much memory; their task is not to store up past events indiscrim- 
inately for eventual recall and meditation but rather to delete traces of the past so as to free 
up capacities. What is held in mind or kept on file from the past signifies only by com- 
parison with present developments, and past events will be recalled only if they can show 
up differences, constructing the present as news. Such cognition could not be less con- 
genial to the ordinary process of literary self-creation, which has traditionally been about 
remembering, not forgetting: Recollection in tranquility. A Madeleine. Literature has 
evolved ways of its own to bridge the gap and to make the past present; but meditation in 
literature is worlds away and out of synch with the flows of mediated time. 
Critical writers trained on the literary tradition may not like the media system, but its 
criteria for producing a full and continuing present are at least clear. Criticism should be no 
less clear in distinguishing literature's and its own medial difference, and instead of 
responding reflexively to signals sent out by the media system, criticism needs to articulate 
its own principle of reflexivity, a way for it (and us) to distinguish ourselves from the 
media system, without ignoring its demands on our attention. 
There are, in fact, a number of essays in the collection that hint at new formulations of 
self-reflexivity in literary, historical, and more recently, technologically mediated, nar- 
ratives - especially those 'active and reflexive' self-constructions that, according to Karin 
Esders, allow for 'an expansion of individual life' in the media environment. Esders's 
terms for such expansive processes, however - 'irony, self-mockery, humor, and playful- 
ness' - repeat the values of an older, more specifically literary postmodernism (77). That in 
itself does not invalidate them except for the fact that the playful ironic stance has already 
been codified, co-opted, and widely recirculated as a recognizable style by the very media 
they were meant to critique. If identity is nothing but a simulation, what's to prevent main- 
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stream culture from simulating minority stances - appropriating the language of victimiza- 
tion, presenting its protagonists as 'queer,' misrepresented, colonized by hegemonic 
power? And if identity is nothing more than a media construction, what's to keep modern 
agencies from having an individual's 'perceptions stamped Acceptable Per Government 
Regulatory Standards' (Cadigan, cited by Kraus log)? As Ruth Mayer points out in her 
essay on the black music scene of the late 1990s, pop cultural resistance is 'a highly pre- 
carious stance, liable to be turned against its originator at the very next moment and to be 
appropriated by the very persons it meant to oppose in the first place' (156). There is 
something robust - Mayer calls it 'style,' Luhmann would call it a necessarily incomplete 
reduction of complexity - going on at the periphery of Simulacrum America, and surely 
one practical function of criticism in the present media system would be to identify shift- 
ing terms of self-stylization through emerging channels of communication. 
To do this without criticism itself becoming a co-opting agent is of course no small chal- 
lenge. And the difficulty of creating a critical reflexivity appropriate to, but different from, 
the reflexivity of the mass media is well illustrated in Peter Schneck's treatment of Avant- 
Pop fiction in the United States. Among the first to proclaim, 'Nomo Pomo,' Avant-Pop 
writers rely not so heavily on postmodern irony and ideology critique. Instead, they would 
appropriate, in Larry McCaffery's words, 'these glitzy, kitschy, easily consumable pop 
materials [as] a rich source of "raw material" whose elements can be explored, played 
with, and otherwise creatively transformed . . . for sustained improvisational purposes' 
(cited in Schneck 67). Although Schneck is skeptical of such claims (they sound to him 
'rather like having your cake and eating it too'), his consideration leads him into a fresh 
understanding of one particular mode or moment in the evolution of literary reflexivity. 
Schneck no longer sees self-awareness as the reflexive mirroring that was such an import- 
ant thematic in both literature and literary theory of the 1960s - when for example John 
Barth in his proto-postmodernist essay 'The Literature of Exhaustion,' could explicitly 
reject the new 'intermedia' arts (like pop art or happenings) in favor of 'the kind of art that 
not many people can do,' meaning, of course, literature and especially the novel (cited by 
Schneck 69). In its exclusively literary self-reflexings, Barth's funhouse turns out to be the 
post-structuralist prison-house of language, whose self-imposed boundaries are perhaps 
only the limitations of a high cultural elitism. Contemporary with, and opposed to, Barth, 
we have Susan Sontag's anti-literary call for the creation of a new and more fluid sensibil- 
ity whose art is 'a new kind of instrument, an instrument for modifying consciousness and 
organizing new modes of sensibility' (cited in Schneck 68). Yet once such cultural distinc- 
tions (between high and low art, literary culture and popular media) have been sufficiently 
weakened, there is little to keep an instrumentalized art from turning into advertising, 
while the once radical conception of an authorless textuality risks becoming yet another 
belittling, by an especially well-connected critic, of un-sponsored individual accomplish- 
ment. Indeed, any art that consciously sets out to modify consciousness or increase sensory 
awareness risks being put in the service of control. 
Sontag's stance 'Against Interpretation' therefore anticipates and urges on the loss of 
critical distance in Simulacrum America. Her work I think rightly rejects the notion of cri- 
ticism as a secondary or belated activity, but it offers no constructive alternative to the self- 
reflective gaze offered by the media culture. (Sontag's primary point of reference, not 
coincidentally, is photography.) The critic looks at how the world is looked at through 
media, but what is missing - and what the best contemporary fiction and critical theory 
manage to evoke - is a second look that reflects our own motives in observing. Instead of 
attacking an observer's ideological commitments from a distanced critical stance, the critic 
might ask how it is that a given media image was produced, and how it might be produced 
differently, from a different position within the field of production. Karin Esders gets at 
this potential displacement of one observational position by another, differently posi- 
tioned, observer when she notices how reading on the Internet can 'tend to multiply rela- 
tionships, subject positions and possible truths' and so generate 'an awareness of the con- 
structed nature of realities and identities' (82). Everything in Simulacrum America may be 
a construction and identity may be limited, as Wittgenstein noted, by 'the limits of our nar- 
rative traditions,' but one thing we now have to work with is our awareneness of this. 'The 
discovery that subjectivity forms rather than reflects its objects of cognition,' in Kraus's 
words, offers a perspective on our own subjectivity that is unavailable to the massive first- 
order reflexivity of the media system (1 18). 
The emergence of this critical sensibility - employing second-order observations sepa- 
rate from the primary observations within the media system - has consequences that the 
collection's less strictly literary essays already put to use. Carolin Auer's discussion of 
social reportage, where a nineteenth-century sociologist goes incognito among her 
working class subjects, is an especially useful case in point because anthropology has 
often been plagued by the problem of how the anthropologist should situate herself in rela- 
tion to her 'subjects.' The power of anthropological research, clearly, is that from the 
anthropologist's very different analytical position, assumptions invisible to the human 
subject under observation can be readily pointed out. The subject's blind spots can be 
illuminated - or rather resituated - as the subject, over time, creates for herself (or has 
created for her) a new lifeworld. (This can of course develop through more direct forms of 
colonization than anthropological observation; what is certain, however, is that the 
lifeworld, if not the individual lives observed, will change as a result of observation.) But 
what of the anthropologist's own assumptions and blind spots? The anthropologist might 
sympathize with the inequalities that produce the worker's lifeworld; she might even share 
in its burdens by taking a factory job and moving among the people, incognito (although, 
unlike them, she always carries emergency money in her jacket lining). But so long as the 
participant observer can go back to her own privileges and her own protected lifeworld, 
'gaps and distortions' in perception will remain (171). Such an observer, no matter how 
well informed or how experienced in the ways and the hardships of the factory worker, is 
hardly in a position to mediate between class interests. The most one can expect is that, in 
observing hidden assumptions within the worker's lifeworld, the anthropologist will be in 
a position to revise the assumptions on which her own security rests. A political con- 
sequence would be the obligation to agitate for the extension of one's own rights and pro- 
tections, rather than a direct call for redistribution of wealth or an attempted mediation by 
one class on the part of the other. 
As experimental literature turns away from a representational aesthetic and philosophy 
no longer pretends to offer intelligible mediations of the real, cultural anthropology may 
be getting away from the notion that the reporter's role is to represent her subject's inter- 
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ests. This movement away from mediation and representation does not however 'rule out 
the functionality of turn-of-the-century social reportage as an instrument of social reform,' 
although it could well lead one to question the goal of instrumentality per se (177). If we 
could let 'the ideal of mediation . . . yield to the fact of constructedness,' as Auer suggests, 
our lost critical distance and suspicion of narrative authenticity would no longer emerge as 
problems. Documentary narrative might then still achieve authenticity 'by oscillating 
between concealing and foregrounding its operations,' and criticism could handle its own 
positioning within the media system by fluctuating between the material and conceptual, 
letting one mode of understanding compensate for the limitations in the other (Auer 177, 
178). 
A similar concern with observation - specifically, the observation of how others 
observe, and how we in turn notice ourselves being observed - has been a longtime con- 
cern in gender studies and is likely to be central to the emerging field of queer studies. 
Work in this area has been concerned explicitly with disrupting or 'queering' representa- 
tion. In much the way that Esders remarks on the multiplication of Internet identities, 
queer theory wants to complicate linear, 'strait,' traditions in narrative and 'dismantle fixed 
identities' -not least the identities marked by the standardized phrases, 'gay' and 'lesbian' 
(de Lauretis, summarized by Braidt 182). We see this 'deconstruction of the autonomous 
subject' at work in Jeanne Cortiel's and Andrea B. Braidt's reflections on 'simulated 
sexualities' in scenes from a number of independent films by self-marked queer directors. 
A beautiful, 'excessively feminine' woman wallcs into an elevator; she is watched by her 
mobster boyfriend but she herself initiates eye contact with a stranger, a butch woman 
whom the boyfriend barely notices. Reading this scene as an audience member, the viewer 
for whom the entire incident has been staged, Cortiel notes the tension between hetero 
'scenarios of voyeurism' normalized by Hollywood and 'the lesbian look' that we, as 
knowing observers, are (at least momentarily) encouraged to adopt. The terms with which 
Cortiel describes this bi-valence suggest that established discourse about 'the gaze of the 
other' might be generalized and enriched from the perspective of systems theory and 
second-order observation theory: 'To access the lesbian look,' Cortiel writes, 'the hetero- 
sexual cinematic gaze in these films first establishes the authority of this deviant look and 
then systematically dismantles its identificatory power.' But - crucially - it is the observer 
herself whose gaze is 'destabilized,' now that she has been made to see openings in the 
network of observations and self-observations that constitute the social. 
If queer theory has something to gain in conceptual clarity from Luhmann's systems 
theory, that theory in its turn could well gain in referential richness from queer theory and 
film studies as these are practiced in the later sections of Simulacrum America. Less con- 
cerned with conceptual forms of reflexivity (how we observe, how we know), these essays 
are more about stressing a medial and material reflexivity - an awareness about the dif- 
ference embodiment and mediality make. Not all media, after all, are mass media operat- 
ing within the realm of information; there will always exist, at the edges of or lurking 
beneath the media system, chances for subjective identification not yet formalized by the 
mass media. This is one source of the emergence and continued unraveling of new cultural 
styles, but of what 'material' is style made? Is it physical? Is it chemical? genetic? ecolo- 
gical? At times, contra Baudrillard, the essays in Simulacrum America suggest that the 
real problem facing society is a proliferation, not a loss, of what one contributor calls 'the 
referential element' (Stockinger 9). If that poses real problems of containment within cur- 
rent disciplinary structures, the discovery of so many materialities at least suggests that 
'the human element' is unlikely to emerge from a single source in a massively mediated, 
'hyperreal world.' 
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